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ABSTRACT 
 
Perhaps the most fundamental question in contemporary European Union politics is whether the 
existing division and sharing of competences between national and supranational levels is 
pragmatically and normatively justifiable. In his classic book, Governing in Europe (1999), Fritz  
Scharpf argues that the current policy mix is sub-optimal and, therefore, democratically illegitimate, 
because the multi-level European polity lacks the ‘problem-solving capacity’ necessary to permit 
citizens and their representatives to bargain to optimal outcomes. Instead it is likely to trigger a vicious 
circle of downward adaptations in social policy and public services that are likely to sap the EU's 
support. Scharpf recommends granting domestic social welfare policies constitutional status in EU 
jurisprudence, and permitting ‘differentiated integration’ or ‘flexibility’ for high-standard countries to 
legislate as an EU sub-group. In this challenge by Scharpf to the ‘output legitimacy’ of the EU, we 
argue, a number of important issues remain unresolved. First, his argument rests on an implicit and 
insufficiently elaborated conception of the public interest in maintaining or expanding current patterns 
of social welfare protection. Second, any effort to specify this “public interest” must address three 
fundamental problems of democratic theory, namely the status of uninformed or inexpert citizens, 
underlying biases in democratic representation, and proper scope of majoritarian decision-making. 
Third, and fully in the spirit of the concerns raised in Governing in Europe, we suggest two possible 
strategies for addressing these concerns and some tools for rethinking output legitimacy and its relation 
both to the ‘public interest’ and to participatory procedures. The research agenda on democratic legiti-
macy in Europe launched by Scharpf is likely to be a lively one for some time to come. 
 
   2
For three decades now, Fritz Scharpf has ranked among our leading analysts 
of national policymaking in the face of globalization.
1 His writing, which has contrib-
uted much to our understanding of how interdependence creates new constraints and 
possibilities for national economic policy, is distinguished by three qualities. 
 
The first is a keen sense of institutional dynamics. While most analyses of 
globalization focus primarily, sometimes exclusively, on the constraints imposed by 
markets on policies of domestic redistribution and regulation, Scharpf balances the 
analysis of markets with a subtle understanding of the constraints and possibilities 
afforded by political institutionalization. Thus his classic critiques of German federal-
ism and macroeconomic policy, while acknowledging the autonomous power of mar-
ket forces, lay primary emphasis on the institutional incentives and constraints that 
restrict ‘problem-solving capacity’—the ability to realize optimal policy choices. For 
Scharpf, the particular constraints imposed by German federalism and the Bundes-
bank statute—as well as the ideologies and expectation that form around them—
ultimately have a decisive impact on policy.
2 
 
The second distinctive quality, related to the first, lies in Scharpf’s consistent 
normative commitment to a particular conception of legitimate political order. There 
is no mistaking his intent to offer a defense of social democracy viewed very much 
from the perspective of a late-twentieth-century advanced industrial democracy in 
Continental Europe—indeed, very much from Germany.
3 In the tradition of Joseph 
Schumpeter and Karl Polanyi, Scharpf stresses the fundamental tension between 
democracy and capitalism: capitalism generates inequality, yet democracy presumes a 
fundamental basis of equality. Most democratically elected governments seek, there-
fore, to offset what Schumpeter termed the ‘creative destruction’ of capitalism 
through ‘market correcting policies,’ including social welfare provision, labor rights, 
and regulatory protection. The broader and deeper the reach of markets, the greater 
the need for offsetting social policies. Seen from this point of view, globalization, by 
extending the scope of markets further than ever in recent history, requires an ap-
propriate institutional response.
4 Much of Scharpf’s work is motivated by his concern 
about specific threats facing the particular institutions developed in postwar Europe. 
 
The third distinctive quality lies in Scharpf’s deep commitment to empirical 
analysis. Many commentators advance assertions about the impact of globalization, 
the (greater or lesser) potential for mobilization against it, and the desirability of vari-
ous outcomes—as if each reflected philosophical truth. Scharpf remains a skeptic in 
the best sense of the word. Theories, he maintains in his work on social scientific 
method, can clarify and elaborate distinctive causal mechanisms in social life, but are 
rarely so crisply formulated as to provide decisive solutions to complex problems. We 
should remain modest, restricting ourselves to mid-level, contextually specific, 
generalizations. Our models must be ‘games real actors can play’—those that are rela-
                                                 
1 We wish to thank Gary Marks and Anne-Marie Slaughter for useful discussions about the subject of this paper. 
This paper is scheduled to appear in an edited volume on the political economy of advanced industrial societies. 
2 E.g. Fritz Scharpf Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
This focus on institutions may very well reflect the fact that Scharpf, almost alone among leading European 
political economists, received graduate training not primarily as an economist or public policy analyst, but as a 
lawyer—and, importantly, at Yale University in the United States at the apogee of American ‘legal realism.’ 
3 E.g. Fritz Scharpf, "Europäisches Demokratie und deutscher Föderalismus," Staatswissenschaft und Staatspraxis 
3 (1992): 296-306. 
4 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time (Boston, Beacon Press, 
1944).   3
tively simple and must avoid placing unreasonable demands on the expertise and 
information-processing capacity of individuals and social groups.
5 If it is not to be-
come circular, the tailoring of models to circumstances in turn requires rigorous and 
detailed empirical analysis—a quality that adds both nuance and robustness to 
Scharpf’s analyses. 
 
Scharpf’s characteristic triad of theoretical subtlety, normative edge, and em-
pirical depth is very much in evidence in his most recent work on the ‘democratic 
deficit’ in the European Union (EU). The EU is an intriguing target for analysis in the 
tradition of Polanyi and Schumpeter. If democratic capitalism indeed rests on an ex-
plicit compromise between markets and social protection, then European integration 
seems the exception: the EU seeks to promote wider and deeper markets without es-
tablishing a correspondingly full range of compensating and counterbalancing social 
and regulatory policies. European politics today rests on a unique division of constitu-
tional competences between national and European authorities. National governments 
continue to monopolize most fiscal activities, and their democratic pedigree rests on 
traditional forms of direct democratic control via elections, parliaments, and political 
parties. They continue to fulfill the classic ‘positive’ functions of civil authority: so-
cial protection, culture, infrastructure, education, and defense. EU institutions, by con-
trast, focus primarily on ‘negative’ functions of government: the liberalization of pro-
duct and factor markets and the creation of a level regulatory playing-field through 
the elimination of undesirable cross-border regulatory externalities. Their fiscal re-
sources are few, and their democratic pedigree rests, at best, on indirect representation 
via officials appointed and ministers named by elected national officials, backed by 
direct but lackadaisical elections to a central parliament with a distinctly circum-
scribed role.  
 
Perhaps the most fundamental issue of contemporary EU politics is whether 
this federal division of competences is pragmatically and normatively justifiable. One 
great virtue of Scharpf’s analysis—which finds its most detailed formulation in the 
already classic 1999 book Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?— is that 
it sets aside from the start two popular but nonetheless unpersuasive approaches to the 
analysis of democratic legitimacy in a uniting Europe.
6 One is that the EU is, or is be-
coming, a technocratic superstate, and that European citizens should thus fear above 
all else encroaching bureaucratic ‘despotism.’
7 This, Scharpf rightly notes, is a curious, 
even confused, claim to advance about such a weak political system as that of the EU. 
A system with so little autonomous power to tax, spend, coerce, or wield administra-
tive discretion, and with procedures so fully hedged about with requirements for on-
going supermajoritarian and unanimous consent from national governments is hardly 
a despotism in the making.
8 A second unpersuasive claim Scharpf sets aside is that the 
EU is democratically illegitimate because it is not an ideal parliamentary and electoral 
democracy, but instead involves the delegation of authority to unelected bodies. Such 
arguments, Scharpf notes, overlook the extensive level of normatively justified dele-
gation found in all advanced industrial democracies, including member states of the 
                                                 
5 Fritz Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy-Research (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1997). 
6 Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Legitimate? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
7 C.f. Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (Allen Lane: Penguin Press, 2000).   
8 Scharpf, Governing, Ch. 1. For a direct critique, see Andrew Moravcsik, “Despotism in Brussels? Misreading the 
European Union,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2001).   4
EU—notably in areas such as constitutional adjudication, central banking, criminal 
prosecution, and technical administration.
9 
 
Scharpf’s main conclusion about European integration can be, and often is, 
stated with deceptive simplicity. Rather than resting on procedural propriety, the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy rests on policy outputs—or, in his language, “output legiti-
macy.” In theory the EU would be democratically legitimate if it structured an appro-
priate balance of market liberalization at the European level and social protection at 
the national level. Yet such a balance is unstable because of the tendency of decen-
tralized market competition to generate a ‘race to the bottom’ in regulatory protection, 
fueled by trade, foreign investment, speculative capital flows, and immigration.
10 The 
EU cannot respond to this tendency effectively because of a neo-liberal bias in its 
constitutional structure, which favors market liberalization (‘negative integration’) 
over social protection (‘positive integration’). Both aggressive EU social policies to 
replace what is lost at the national level or, perhaps preferable, explicit legal norms 
that protect and promote domestic social welfare systems, are thereby ruled out. The 
resulting policy mix is sub-optimal and, therefore, democratically illegitimate. The 
multi-level European polity lacks the ‘problem-solving capacity’ necessary to permit 
actors to bargain to optimal outcomes and is likely to move into a vicious circle of 
welfare adaptations that will sap consensual support for existing Continental systems. 
In sum, European citizens find themselves in an institutional ‘trap’ of their own con-
struction. The existing European compromise, Scharpf concludes, should be but-
tressed in two ways: by granting domestic social welfare policies constitutional status 
in EU jurisprudence, and by permitting ‘differentiated integration’ or ‘flexibility’ in 
which countries with high regulatory standards are permitted to legislate within the 
EU as a sub-group.
11  
 
This critique—presented here in a simple, even simplistic form—constitutes 
one of the most carefully crafted and compelling criticisms of the EU’s democratic le-
gitimacy to date. The sophistication and stringency of its qualifications, empirical and 
theoretical, add to its power. It should therefore be—and is sure to become—the un-
avoidable point of departure for any further scholarly inquiry. Nonetheless, its empiri-
cal verification, the detailed structure of assumptions and claims on which it rests, and 
the derivation of its normative consequences, reveal hidden complexity and ambigu-
ity. 
 
In highlighting these critical tensions in Scharpf’s case against the ‘output le-
gitimacy’ of the EU, we proceed in three stages. First, we establish that his argument 
for the neoliberal bias depends on an implicit conception of the public interest—a 
conception which, although key to his account, is not fully elaborated in Governing in 
Europe. Second, we seek to show that this omission leaves the case for output legiti-
macy open to a series of hypothetical objections. In particular, any such analysis must 
address three fundamental problems of democratic theory: the status of uninformed or 
inexpert citizens in a complex world, the problem of underlying biases in democratic 
representation, and the problem of the proper scope of majoritarian decision-making. 
Third, and fully in the spirit of the concerns raised in Governing in Europe, we offer 
                                                 
9 Scharpf, Governing, pp. 11-12. 
10 Scharpf, Governing, p. 34. 
11 Scharpf believes redistributive challenges must be “faced at the national level where European welfare states 
must find solutions that are compatible with, and robust against, much more intense international economic com-
petition.” Scharpf, Governing, p. 202.   5
two possible strategies for addressing these concerns and suggest some tools for re-
thinking output legitimacy and its relation both to the ‘public interest’ and to partici-
patory procedures. The research agenda on democratic legitimacy in Europe implic-
itly sketched by Scharpf is likely to be a lively one for some time to come. 
 
I. WHAT IS THE ‘PUBLIC INTEREST’? 
 
Scharpf launches Governing in Europe by presenting two conceptions of 
legitimacy. The first is ‘input legitimacy,’ or ‘government by the people.’ For Scharpf, 
input legitimacy requires that collective decisions ‘reflect the general will’ as articu-
lated in widely participatory procedures. Starting from a justification of majority rule, 
the central obstacle confronting any ‘input-based’ argument is to explain why the 
minority should accept the decision of a majority, given that everyone’s interests must 
be given equal consideration. Empirically, Scharpf continues, input legitimacy there-
fore requires that there must be a high level of civic trust and solidarity, which, if gen-
erally recognized, will provide assurance to everyone that their interests are being 
taken into account. This will make it more likely that minorities will not only acqui-
esce (out of fear, for example) but also accept that the majority has the legitimate 
authority to enact their program in the form of generally binding law. Scharpf does 
not explore this notion in greater detail, but rather appears to follow Joseph Weiler 
and others in assuming that acceptance of majority opinion must rest on a deep nor-
mative sense of identity and that, in general, such trust is provided by a shared com-
mon identity—an identity based on history, fate, memory, constitution, and nation.
12 
Where political arguments are based on such a shared identity, majority rule can be 
considered to represent the ‘will of the people’ as a whole.  
 
The second conception of legitimacy, ‘output legitimacy,’ as Scharpf presents 
it, does not require a common identity but only common interests. Here the emphasis 
is on the satisfaction of wider classes of ‘problem-solving concerns’ which can be 
shared by members of various, nested or overlapping groups. Output legitimacy is 
‘government for the people,’ government oriented to the public interest rather than to 
the ‘general will.’ While output legitimacy also requires the existence of an identifi-
able (and therefore bounded) constituency, it does not require the same reliance on 
trust and ‘thick’ identity as does input legitimacy. The general presumption is that the 
base of legitimacy upon which output arguments rely, lacking the strong solidarity 
typical of common identities, is more precarious and less far-reaching than its coun-
terpart.
13 The main question for output arguments is: Who benefits? If the distribu-
tional pattern promoted by policy is in the ‘public interest,’ then it is output legitimate 
whatever the procedures used to achieve it. The value of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘repre-
sentation’ is more consonant with output-based arguments, where ‘participation’ is for 
                                                 
12 Scharpf, Governing, pp. 7-10. It is worth noting here that this restrictive conception of “input” legitimacy, which 
links closely with thick identity, is hardly unproblematic. There are a number of alternative motivations for 
accepting redistribution by majority rule. One is that citizens, despite deep and pervasive political disagreement, 
hold broadly liberal conceptions about procedure. Another might be a deep sense of what Robert Keohane has 
termed ‘diffuse reciprocity’—the need to structure complex exchanges and linkages across time and issues—
motivates their concessions on redistributive issues. Robert O. Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations,” 
International Organization 40 (Spring 1986): 1-27. 
13 This, too, is questionable. One might argue that bonds of interest involve greater ‘sunk costs’ and long-term in-
vestments than bonds of cultural identity, at least at the international level. See, for example, Andrew Moravcsik, 
‘The Choice for Europe – Current Commentary and Future Research’ (Reply to James Caporaso, Fritz Scharpf, 
and Helen Wallace), Journal of European Public Policy (March 1999): 178-179.   6
input ones. For Scharpf, Rousseau is primarily an input theorist, Madison and Schum-
peter primarily output theorists. 
 
Given that Europe at the moment lacks the collective identity required for in-
put legitimacy, Scharpf argues that the EU must be legitimized primarily in output 
terms. Output legitimacy requires in turn an appropriate balance of market liberaliza-
tion (at the European level) and social protection (at the national level). To do so, it 
must be able to reestablish at the European level any national regulations it disman-
tles. And there’s the rub. The EU is, according to Scharpf, quite effective in producing 
‘negative integration’ (primarily market-making regulation) but only partially effec-
tive in encouraging ‘positive integration’ (primarily although not exclusively market-
correcting regulation). As a result of a series of ‘powerful institutional mechanisms’ 
(primarily related to the Commission’s agenda-setting power and the ECJ’s ‘stealth’), 
the EU’s main supranational organs ‘undermine and change the negotiation positions 
of national governments.’ As a result, the Commission and Court have been able to 
push negative integration ‘as it were behind the back of politically legitimized ac-
tors.’
14 At the same time, even if member states were to agree that competences over 
social policy should be transferred and protected at a European level, fundamental 
conflicts of interest among member states—produced by different modes of financing, 
running, and organizing the welfare state—make positive integration in employment, 
industrial relations, and social policy all but impossible. Distorted by the unintended 
institutional dynamics of supranational policymaking, the empty rhetoric of EU elites, 
and the recalcitrant interests of other member states, the EU has succeeded in thwart-
ing the public interest in favor of a highly unpopular neoliberal agenda. As a result, 
the EU suffers from an illegitimate neoliberal bias.  
 
Scharpf’s general empirical argument for the neo-liberal bias must therefore 
stand or fall with his argument for what the public interest ultimately is. If he is right 
that the public interest would be better served by the ECJ’s enforcement of anti-
regulatory-competition law than by national politics on their own (independently or 
via the Council), then he has shown that, by ‘output standards’ the EU is, as currently 
organized, illegitimate. If, on the other hand, the public interest is better served by 
liberalization, then, assuming for the moment that there is in fact a neoliberal tenden-
cy promoted by the EU, there is no neoliberal bias. 
 
Some may object at this point that Scharpf’s analysis does not in fact require a 
substantive conception of the public interest, as we have just implied it does.
15 The 
aim of his reforms, one might argue, is simply to relax constraints by restoring lost 
‘problem-solving capacities’ to governments and their constituents. On this objection, 
national publics should be allowed to decide for themselves the particular balance of 
social protection and market liberalization that they prefer, which they are unable to 
do under conditions of globalization and integration. According to Scharpf, 
 
… legitimacy is reduced when policy areas that were previously the 
object of authentic and effective political choices in democratically 
constituted polities are pre-empted either by newly arising necessities 
                                                 
14 Scharpf, Governing, pp. 70-1. 
15 We are indebted to Gary Marks for proposing this potential objection.   7
or by coming under the control of politically non-accountable 
authorities.
16 
 
Yet it is, in fact, not open to him to presume that his reforms merely allow states 
greater latitude of choice whatever it is that they want to choose. After all, one of the 
main normative arguments for delegation to ‘non-majoritarian’ institutions such as in-
dependent courts, central banks, and regulatory agencies—which Scharpf endorses in 
principle—is precisely that, although they require taking decisions out of the hands of 
parliaments, they are justified by their consequences. In these cases, it might be ar-
gued, loss of democratic control enhances the ability of political system to produce 
outcomes in the public interest. Fewer constraints are not always better, especially on 
a conception of legitimacy that depends only on outputs.
17 This is, after all, one of 
Scharpf’s own arguments for policing, via delegation to Commission and Court, those 
state decisions over social policy that are directly affected by regulatory competition.
18 
Greater freedom of choice must always be justified within a complex relationship to 
other important constitutional constraints—for example, human rights, boundaries, in-
centive structures and constitutive rules. Any output legitimacy argument must there-
fore justify the conception of the “public interest’ on which it necessarily rests. 
 
Scharpf’s reliance on an underlying conception of the “public interest” is ex-
plicitly articulated in his premise that Europeans have ‘at the very minimum … come 
to expect that that democratic state should be able to prevent mass unemployment that 
would exclude large parts of the working-age population from active participation in 
the processes of social production; to prevent extreme poverty that would force per-
sons to live below socially acceptable levels of income and access to life chances; and 
to assure a fair sharing of benefits and tax burdens.’
19 Despite its centrality, this gener-
al formulation is as close as Scharpf gets in Governing in Europe to a definitive state-
ment of the underlying ‘public interest’ that his proposals are designed to defend. 
 
At this level of generality, this statement of the ‘public interest’ would find 
few critics. Fairness, social inclusion, and high growth and employment are unques-
tionably desirable policy outcomes. The difficulty emerges when one tries to specify 
more concretely what tradeoffs and considerations are admissible in applying  this 
standard to actual cases. Faced with real-world distributional conflicts, limited infor-
mation, and a constrained range of policy options, how do we know under what con-
ditions policy outcomes are in the ‘public interest’ and hence output legitimate? What 
counts, for example, as a ‘fair sharing of burdens,’ ‘social exclusion,’ or ‘acceptable 
levels of income and access’? When used to defend real-world policy reforms, with 
all their tradeoffs and limitations, is Scharpf’s conception of the public interest really 
as uncontroversial—i.e., ‘consensual’—as he assumes? 
                                                 
16 Scharpf, Governing, p. 16. 
17 There are many similar arguments in the normative literature, for example, Stephen Holmes, Passions and 
Constraint: on the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Jon Elster, Ulysses 
Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints (Cambridge University Press, 2000); and for an 
argument against, see Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), Ch. 
13. For an application to the EU, see Andrew Moravcsik, “Federalism in the European Union: Rhetoric and Real-
ity,” in Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaïdis, eds. The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in 
the US and the EU (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) and “Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union 
or: How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the `Democratic Deficit,’” Journal of Common Market Studies 
40
th Anniversary Edition (forthcoming). 
18 Scharpf, Governing, Ch. 5, especially pp. 190ff.  
19 Scharpf, Governing, p. 121.   8
II. The Foundations of Output Legitimacy 
 
Satisfactory answers to such fundamental constitutional inquiries, we submit, 
require greater attention the deeper premises underlying the equation of output legiti-
macy and social protection. These premises are far from uncontroversial, and in this 
section we consider three hypothetical objections to Scharpf's argument for the neo-
liberal bias. While highlighting a series of “real-world” empirical concerns, each ob-
jection rests on a fundamental constraint on simple majoritarianism derived from 
foundational democratic theory. The first constraint is imposed by the limited infor-
mation and expertise of publics and elites, the second by underlying biases in societal 
and domestic preference aggregation, and the third by ambiguities in the geographical 
scope of majorities. 
 
A. The Problem of Information and Expertise: Is the EU actually biased? 
 
Is the European polity biased against the provision of social welfare, as 
Scharpf argues? There is no question, of course, that the constitutional order of the 
EU contains more explicit provisions and more permissive procedures for liberaliza-
tion and deregulation than it does for common social welfare legislation or for the 
recognition of national social welfare systems. Moreover, many citizens and elites 
perceive the EU as being inimical to social welfare provision, and have made this as-
pect of integration a matter for public controversy. Yet if we look more closely—and, 
in particular, if we consider the ‘multi-level’ system of European governance as a 
whole—it is unclear whether these formal characteristics add up to evidence of a net 
bias in European policy-making.  
 
Whereas it might be tempting to assert, as many do, that the EU excels at 
‘negative’ integration but not ‘positive’ integration, this is an empirically untenable 
position, as Scharpf himself notes. In fact the level of social protection provided by 
the EU varies greatly across issue areas. Alongside the effective implementation of 
the single market (including the constitutionalization of competition policy, trade, 
agriculture, and telecoms and the establishment of the ‘four freedoms’), the EU has 
provided consistently high social protection in matters of environmental, health, safe-
ty, competition, banking, gender and insurance policy. Yet, Scharpf rightly points out, 
this tendency toward European ‘re-regulation’ has not always extended to social, tax, 
industrial relations, and employment policy. To show that there is an ‘output illegiti-
mate’ neo-liberal bias in EU rule-making, rather than simply an ‘output legitimate’ 
neoliberal trend, Scharpf must in fact demonstrate that the public interest is only par-
tially realized in the mix of social policies re-regulated at the EU level. 
 
In recent EU decision-making, Scharpf seeks to demonstrate such a bias by fo-
cusing on the narrower area of EU public service regulation. To a certain extent, he is 
right to do so. There are indeed a limited number of cases—notably in telecommuni-
cations and certain transport functions—in which the Commission or Court has em-
ployed EU directives or suits to undermine coherent national systems of public ser-
vice provision, but even here Scharpf (with admirable empirical honesty and preci-
sion) suggests that they did so in response to strong technological imperatives, backed 
by widespread national government support, and generally with adequate regulatory 
protection. For the most part—and restricting ourselves only to the sensitive sectors of 
social regulation discussed in Scharpf’s work—the Commission and Court have expli-
citly backed away from breaking down many legitimate national regulations in the   9
area of social and process regulations, including Swedish alcohol regulations, German 
indirect subsidies for renewable energy, and telecommunications subsidies. Scharpf 
devotes a chapter to distilling lessons from the relatively successful Dutch welfare re-
forms, which took place without benefit of the EU reforms Scharpf proposes.
20  
 
Why have national governments been able to hold the line in critical cases, ac-
cording to Scharpf? It appears to be, above all, because of “the political commitment 
of national governments to social-policy purposes and by the political resistance of 
groups that would suffer from deregulation.”
21 What appears most striking about EU 
policymaking taken as a whole is thus not the potential for a “Delaware effect” but, to 
the contrary, the consistently high levels of regulation found where national govern-
ments or citizens unambiguously desire it, even where no clear legal requirement or 
market compulsion exists.
22 Yet if intense political commitment is enough to block a 
race to the bottom, and if no political commitment of modern European states is as 
strong as that to social welfare provision, one might ask, is there reason to be worried 
about output legitimacy? At the very least, we must conclude that there appears to be 
little concrete evidence of a powerful bias toward undesired deregulation within the 
EU system.  
 
Even if it could be shown that the EU exerts significant downward pressure on 
social protection, moreover, there is good reason to believe that such pressure is re-
dundant. The truly binding constraints on national social policies—increasing con-
straints on the willingness of Europeans to be taxed, an accelerating demographic 
shift toward an older population, a shift to service-sector production, and rising costs 
of specialized service provision—may well be largely independent of market integra-
tion and European law. Overall levels of social spending have remained stagnant in 
the past fifteen years and most European societies are finding it impossible to main-
tain current levels of per recipient spending and regulatory protection. These trends 
will continue regardless of EU policy—even if the apparent constraint takes the form 
of external competitiveness.
23  
 
Scharpf, it should be noted, concedes that national systems are in need of sig-
nificant restructuring and reform. Indeed, one reading of his own proposals is that 
                                                 
20 Scharpf, Governing, pp. 121-156. 
21 Scharpf, Governing, p. 101. See also Fritz W. Scharpf, “The European Social Model: Coping with the Chal-
lenges of Diversity,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40
th Anniversary Issue (forthcoming). Scharpf’s balanced 
and honest empirical treatment is an admirable exception in the literature. Generally episodes of independent 
supranational activity—e.g. ephemeral financial discretion wielded by the Commission in structural policy 
funding, the Commission’s use of Article 90 to liberalize telecommications, and the ECJ’s assertion of the 
assertion of the supremacy of European law—receive scholarly attention out of proportion to their potential import 
or generalizability, thus biasing our overall understanding of European integration. The great majority of poli-
cies—from external trade policy to agricultural policy to standardization policy—continue to track a consensus of 
national preferences relatively closely.  
22 The most plausible theoretical account of this appears to be a classically intergovernmental one, whereby super-
majoritarian (sometimes unanimous) voting rules and myriad means of informal control consistently permit na-
tional majorities to protect their intense interests at the European level.  
23 Three examples must suffice: Martin Rhodes, Maurizio Ferrera and Anton Hemerijck, “Recasting European 
Welfare States for the 21st Century” European Review (Summer 2000); Torben Iversen, Contested economic insti-
tutions: the politics of macroeconomics and wage bargaining in advanced democracies (Cambridge University 
Press, 1999); Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson, eds., European social policy: between fragmentation and inte-
gration (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution, 1995). It is true, however, that the costs of social welfare bene-
fits are born increasingly by the recipients of those benefits, rather than by the wealthy—a point Scharpf rightly 
highlights. As a result, systems as a whole are redistributing less than they might otherwise. Some attribute this to 
interdependence, but there are many other explanations; cf. Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? 
(Washington, Institute for International Economics, 1997).   10
they do not democratize EU decision-making per se or even promise to sustain cur-
rent patterns of spending as much as they redirect the insulated institutions of the EU 
to the task of promoting more sustainable national social welfare systems, just as EU 
institutions have been used in the past to protect and promote healthier and fairer na-
tional market regulation.
24 He is relatively sanguine about the prospects, because he 
believes European welfare systems are generally stable if only perverse tax incentives 
in lower brackets are reformed to create greater incentives for job creation and if sup-
port for taxation remains high. National governments, he hints, would implement such 
reforms if only they are not prevented from doing so by EU regulations, by pressures 
for international competitiveness, or by the false belief that international competitive-
ness would be endangered.
25 Yet one need not be an uncompromising Hayekian to en-
tertain the possibility that national political systems are more likely to enact the neces-
sary reforms if external economic and legal pressure is sustained, as market liberals 
advocate, rather than if the EU shields overall levels of social spending from com-
petitive pressures, as social democrats prefer.  
 
If the counterarguments we have just sketched are valid—for the moment we 
remain agnostic, stating only that the case against the existence of bias is at least as 
strong as the case for it—they call into question the normative importance of public 
and elite concern about the EU’s democratic legitimacy. From the perspective of dem-
ocratic theory, the point is fundamental: One common reason to question a straight-
forward equation between short-term democratic preferences and the “public interest” 
is that public attitudes may be based on questionable information or assumptions 
about cause and effect.
26 From a policy perspective, similarly, the need for more reli-
able (i.e. more informed, consistent and expert) opinion in complex matters is one 
common reason why various regulatory functions are insulated from direct political 
contestation and majoritarian decision-making.
27 In sum, if the EU does not have the 
effects Scharpf attributes to it—or those effects are modest enough to be outweighed 
by the benefits—then the EU may not in fact exhibit an alarming neoliberal bias. 
 
B. The Problem of Underlying Bias: Does the EU Offset Prior Domestic 
Misrepresentation? 
 
Let us now assume, for the moment, that Scharpf’s basic diagnosis of EU pol-
icy is correct—namely that it imparts a strong neo-liberal bias beyond the constraints 
already imposed by demographic, fiscal and other structural trends. The question still 
arises whether most Europeans actually favor the trade-offs needed to sustain existing 
social regulation, or whether they in fact favor the more neo-liberal policy mix cur-
rently provided by the EU—and, if they do, whether their views are themselves philo-
                                                 
24 E.g., Scharpf, “European Social Model,” especially pp. 4-7; Scharpf, Governing, p. 153.  
25 On the viability of existing systems, see Fritz W. Scharpf and Vivien A. Schmidt, eds., Welfare and Work in the 
Open Economy Vol.1: From Vulnerability to Competitiveness and Vol. 2: Diverse Responses to Common Challen-
ges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Scharpf and Schmidt argue that declining support for high taxation 
could endanger this social compromise, but Scharpf himself appears to attribute the lack of popular or national 
support for a stronger and more coherent European social policy to ideological distortionsspurious “killer argu-
ments” about competitiveness and unfortunate “framing” of issues in terms of European integration and diverse in-
stitutional legacies of national systems, though none of these are assessed in sufficient empirical detail to reach a 
definitive conclusion. Both the ability of some systems (e.g. the Dutch) and the inability of others (e.g. the Ger-
man) to reform could be cited as evidence on each side.  Scharpf, “European Social Model,” Fiesole April 2002, p. 
17. 
26 This is Stephen Lukes’ “third face” of power. Stephen Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London, Macmillan, 
1974). 
27 Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).    11
sophically justified. It might be argued—at times by Scharpf, among others—that 
European social welfare systems entrench powerful special interests at the expense of 
the longer-term interests of a more diffuse citizenry. If this is so, EU policy might best 
be analyzed in the context of a multi-level governance system—and thus not a policy 
properly designed to be neutral, but as a policy designed to counteract preexisting 
biases in national policy.
28 If we consider its function as providing a forum to offset 
the national underepresentation of diffuse interests, a neo-liberal EU may in fact be 
output legitimate.  
 
It is hardly controversial to observe—as does Scharpf himself—that existing 
European systems of social protection tend to perpetuate a number of inequitable poli-
cies. The current structure of welfare systems increasingly reflects the special and im-
mediate interests of distinct groups of recipients—a mix of the elderly, the employed, 
and the unhealthy that varies somewhat across countries—as against a larger and 
somewhat longer-term interests of the young, the unemployed, and the healthy. A 
forced rebalancing of the priorities of that spending, as well as perhaps a net reduction 
in taxation and a controlled decline in social welfare spending, may well serve the 
broad “public interest.” 
 
An additional impediment to reform of existing welfare systems lies in their 
bias toward recipients as against taxpayers. Existing systems create obligations and 
entitlements that tend to expand automatically, and have arguably developed beyond 
the willingness of individuals to support and finance them. This is true not just in an 
abstract sense (a larger but diffuse group of individuals are paying for an influential 
minority) but in a concrete sense (a reduction in the state sector reflects the current 
trend in popular preferences toward greater support for conservative policies). Gian-
domenico Majone argues, for example, that “advocates of a European welfare state 
must face the fact that in several countries even national redistribution in favor of 
poorer communities is increasingly challenged in the name of fiscal federalism and re-
gional autonomy.” He continues, “these being the preferences of the national elector-
ates, we can only conclude that the democratic deficit, in the literal sense, is demo-
cratically justified.”
29  Insofar as such efforts at domestic reform have failed—and 
most have—the obstruction arguably owed as much to the protests and single-issue 
votes of powerful and concentrated groups of privileged recipients as to broad popular 
opposition. 
 
Finally, established welfare systems favor current interests over longer-term 
commitments. Even if one were to concede that giving ‘the people what they want’ 
currently requires greater protection for services threatened by EU liberalization, in-
sulating future groups against future cuts—in accordance with Scharpf’s proposed ‘re-
flexive European law’—might be illegitimate. If in years past it was wrong to consti-
tutionalize a bias toward liberalization, then might it not be wrong today to constitu-
tionalize social democratic commitments made in the 1960s and 1970s—indeed, just 
at the moment when they are being questioned?  
 
                                                 
28 This view has affinities not just with Scharpf’s own work on multi-level governance, but with Joseph Weiler’s 
attractive vision of the EU as a body designed primarily to curb the most egotistical features of modern nation-
states. See Joseph Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor? (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). 
29 Giandomenico Majone, “Europe’s Democratic Deficit,” European Law Journal 4,1 (1998):  14.   12
Scharpf in fact concedes the powerful role of special interests in national wel-
fare states and the corresponding need to rebalance national systems. The primary 
purpose of EU social policy, in his view, should be to create the political space in 
which to enact the needed reforms by eliminating spurious law and rhetoric that en-
courages efforts to slash it. Yet it might equally be argued that in this context the EU 
might contribute to the empowerment of diffuse interests in welfare reform—as has 
occurred for more progressive purposes in generating relatively high environmental, 
occupational safety, gender equality, consumer policy and biotechnology standards—
by enforcing a floor of social welfare benefits.
30 The practical policy question is, as we 
noted above, whether Scharpf’s permissive social welfare regime would encourage 
the mobilization of this reformist coalition more effectively than the current combin-
ation of EU market and legal pressures are doing.  
 
From the perspective of normative democratic theory, this raises another fun-
damental concern undermining the unproblematic equation of short-term preferences 
and legitimate “public interest.” This concern arises when existing democratic pro-
cedures distort preference aggregation and generate unrepresentative outcomes—as 
do all systems of representation. In particular it is common for the open expression of 
attitudes to reflect special interests rather than broader but more diffuse majorities.
31 If 
a majority of Europeans favor a reduction or restructuring of national welfare spend-
ing, as they appear to be doing now and may well do in the future, then Scharpf’s 
proposals for defending the status quo cannot be justified by invoking public views 
per se. 
 
If this is so, then the current high level of social welfare protection in Europe 
is perhaps best defended not as the most representative policy, but as something akin 
to a fundamental human right—that is, as an entitlement essentially constitutive of 
human dignity or of some very deep normative consensus among Europeans.
32 This is 
an eminently defensible, even admirable, position—one with which we have great 
sympathy. But its defense requires substantive moral argument, since the proper bal-
ance between minority rights and majority opinion cannot itself be readily ascertained 
by everyday majoritarian means. Only a deeper notion of either output or input legiti-
macy can reconcile the sort of increasingly intense domestic and transnational trade-
offs and conflicts that would arise. This leads us to the final hypothetical criticism. 
 
C. The Problem of Scope: Where are the Proper Boundaries? 
 
A third reason to question the straightforward equation of short-term prefer-
ences and the ‘public interest’ arises when the scope of preference aggregation is un-
clear or contested. What if disagreements arise among majorities (and thus between 
minorities) at different levels of government? Scharpf’s proposed reforms privilege 
national interests—indeed, particular national interests—rather than transnational 
ones. 
 
                                                 
30 Paul Pierson and Stefan Leibfried, eds. European Social Policy (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1995). On 
this general function of the EU, see Andrew Moravcsik, Why the European Community Strengthens the State: 
International Cooperation and Domestic Politics (Cambridge, MA: Center for European Studies Working Paper 
Series No. 52, Harvard University, 1994). 
31 In a sense this simply deepens the analysis under the preceding point, since one force undermining European 
social welfare systems is, of course, special interest pressure. 
32Jytte Klausen, War and welfare: Europe and the United States, 1945 to the Present (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1998).   13
As with most empirical notions of democratic legitimacy that rest on an under-
lying consensus, Scharpf’s initial specification of output legitimacy requires a ‘bound-
ed constituency’ in the minimal sense required to identify ‘common problem-solving 
concerns’ and ‘common interests.’ Scharpf’s claim is that a consensus among Euro-
peans supports the principle of social welfare provision and that his practical plan for 
enforcing it—a multi-tiered system of harmonized spending on welfare backed ulti-
mately by the threat that subgroups of richer countries will create their own arrange-
ments—follows directly from it. Yet there is much heterogeneity across European 
publics, which renders it unclear what the relevant scope of problem-solving is or 
ought to be in the case of European social policy. How is it that this particular solu-
tion is preferred to either transnational redistribution or default to purely national wel-
fare provision? 
 
It might seem that the most natural ‘constituency’ would be composed of all 
European citizens taken as European citizens, rather than as members of national pub-
lics. In this view, European social policy must be justified by the existence of a clear 
transnational majority in Europe in favor of social democratic values. Yet this is 
problematic. We cannot consistently appeal to transnational majorities when justify-
ing the enforcement of social democratic values against liberal states, while simul-
taneously arguing that social democracy should only be applied nationally. If all 
Europeans are citizens of a common polity committed to social democratic principles, 
then why does Scharpf not favor a European system of social protection that transfers 
resources from the richest to the poorest countries, rather than one designed primarily 
to preserve the current welfare benefits of those in more wealthy countries? Or, al-
though perhaps second-best, why not an enhanced version of current arrangements—
continued market integration backed by fiscal transfers to poorer countries, without 
corresponding increases in benefits for displaced workers in richer countries?  
 
Scharpf’s position here is ambivalent. On the one hand he invokes cross-
national differences in popular preferences for taxes and transfers as the primary rea-
son—as he recognizes under the rubric of conflicting ‘constellations of interest’—to 
rule out a common social policy.
33 At the same time, he clearly believes it would be a 
mistake to take seriously only those interests that all Europeans actually share across 
member states—which would appear to rule out consensual adoption of the rules he 
proposes. The consensus of existing views, or even a plausible qualified majority po-
sition, would at best lead to precisely the level and scope of re-regulation that Scharpf 
thinks is illegitimate. Hence he favors granting sub-groups of the full EU membership 
the right to move forward in concert.
34  
 
It follows that if domestic welfare transfers are to claim weight in our con-
siderations at least equal to, if not greater than, transnational transfers, then output 
legitimacy must be defined in terms of service to the interests and preferences cast up 
by the (input legitimate) processes of national states and national publics. On this 
                                                 
33 Scharpf, Governing; “European Social Model.” 
34 The opposition of EU governments to strong European social regulation with the same intensity as liberalizing 
policies has been a constant of European integration over 50 years. It is hardly plausible to assert that it is an un-
intended or chance consequence of previous decisions for other purposes. We cannot defend this point in full detail 
here, but generally see Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina 
to Maastricht (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). Even if it were indisputable that the EU’s liberalizing 
agenda was unintended by member states, moreover, this would not be enough to establish Scharpf’s position. We 
would still need to know that states, in opposing this agenda, are promoting the public interest, not just to the 
interests of powerful particularistic interests.   14
view, the EU should help member states achieve their own public interest, defined in 
terms of the preferences and interests that actually exist within national publics. 
Scharpf seems to be arguing that the public interest that Europeans have in common is 
limited to nationally-bound allegiance to principles of internal redistribution nega-
tively constrained only by a ‘Kantian’ regard for the attempts of other states to 
achieve their own aims without undue interference.
35 German society, for example, 
has only minimal obligations of ‘social cohesion’ toward Portuguese workers in Por-
tugal as compared with its obligations to German workers within Germany.  
 
If this is so, however, then Scharpf’s output legitimacy argument is rather 
heavily reliant on a particular, and rather strongly held, view of input legitimacy—one 
that restricts the scope of our cosmopolitan sentiments in favor of national solidarity. 
Yet if this is indeed to be our working understanding of input legitimacy, we face a 
grave difficulty stemming from the fact that member countries of the EU differ not 
just in their level of development but in their political ideology. The critical question 
is why the ‘public interest’ of more social democratic polities should prevail over the 
‘public interest’ of more liberal polities. What may appear a neoliberal bias within one 
member state may not within another. These boundaries are often deep, as Scharpf 
notes, following classic work by Esping-Andersen and others: 
 
Groups of countries differ not only in the average levels of social 
spending but, even more significantly, in their definitions of the 
demarcation line separating the functions the welfare state is expected 
to perform from those that are left to private provision, either in the 
family or by the market.
36 
 
From the current, say, British or Spanish perspective, for example, does the EU un-
justifiably bias outcomes in a neoliberal direction?  
 
We cannot argue in favor of Scharpf’s proposals that they simply permit the 
British to opt out, since the existence of flexible collaboration within subgroups 
would create the possibility for collaboration and possibly harm the interests of those 
British firms facing industries in foreign countries, like Germany and Sweden, which 
would be shielded by (now more legitimate) subsidies and special derogations that 
have the effect of non-tariff barriers. Similar arguments could be advanced from the 
point of view of the poorer accession countries of Eastern and Central Europe. If the 
social policy proposals do not command the unanimous consent of the member states, 
as the current liberal order did, one might ask why the views of a current EU majority 
be permitted to trump the outcome of future domestic and transnational deliberation 
and decision-making in an increasingly controversial matter of public concern? An-
swers to these questions are, we hope to have shown by now, difficult to formulate 
within an output legitimacy analysis that equates observed national preferences with 
the public interest. 
 
III. TWO PATHS FORWARD: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
So far, we have placed significant weight on the specification of the public in-
terest, arguing that it functions as a lynchpin to the rest of an ‘output legitimacy’ argu-
                                                 
35 See Scharpf, Governing, Conclusion.  
36 Scharpf, “European Social Model,” p. 6.    15
ment. We have pointed to three hypothetical objections to Scharpf’s prima facie case 
for the partial illegitimacy of the EU—without thereby concluding he is incorrect. We 
insist only that such a case requires a firmer understanding of how to cope with basic 
normative issues, such as the status of ignorant or inexpert publics, the proper allow-
ance for underlying biases in preference aggregation, the weight given social rights, 
and the resolution of tensions between alternative scopes of jurisdiction. 
 
In responding to these difficulties, we might adopt one or both of two general 
strategies, which correspond respectively to two different but complementary direc-
tions in which scholars might extend Scharpf’s insights. The first is a broadly empiri-
cal strategy, in which one uses macro-level public opinion analysis to determine ‘what 
the people really want.’ The second strategy is a more explicitly normative one, in 
which one engages directly with the moral-political values and traditions of specific 
political communities to determine which interests, preferences, and principles should 
be considered relevant in constructing a standard of the public interest and at what 
level of aggregation they should be considered. In this section, we will demonstrate 
that although normative work is silent prologue to any more robustly empirical ac-
count of output legitimacy, there are still two distinguishable ways of pursuing output 
legitimacy, the first of which still retains a distinctly empirical edge.
37 At stake is the 
future research agenda on the democratic legitimacy of the EU. 
 
A. The Role of Empirical Analysis 
 
It might be thought that output legitimacy theorists can avoid the thrust of the 
three hypothetical objections canvassed above by deepening the empirical analysis. If 
Scharpf has offered an essentially empirical analysis of EU citizens’ disaffection with 
regards to European integration, whereby individuals by and large gauge their support 
for European integration based on the perceived congruence between outcomes and 
the public interest as they see it, then Governing in Europe could be bolstered by an 
even deeper analysis of European public opinion and a recommendation to EU actors 
about how best to increase general support for the EU. On this view, all reference to 
the public interest would be internal to citizens’ beliefs, and hence not ‘imposed’ by 
the observer or by contingent circumstances. There would be no need to give an ac-
count of the public interest beyond what people think it is. There is some textual sup-
port for such an interpretation of Scharpf’s intent—even though he never systematic-
ally refers to public opinion in Governing in Europe.
 38  
 
In this view, the key to evaluating the output legitimacy of the EU is to find 
out ‘what the people really want’ by conducting empirical analyses of public opinion. 
Use of the highly imperfect Eurobarometer data for this purpose, albeit with quite 
variable degrees of rigor, has become a commonplace of Brussels policy discourse. 
Ideally, however, better data and analysis might be used as an external and unbiased 
standard to measure the legitimacy of EU outcomes.
39 There need be nothing neces-
sarily ‘normative’ about such an enterprise: just as we need not deploy normative ap-
                                                 
37 This wording is borrowed from Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 
p. 90. He employs the categories in a somewhat different context. 
38 See Scharpf, Governing, p. 22. Here Scharpf seems to be equating ‘output-oriented legitimacy’ with general 
support.  
39 There is no need to think of this ‘individual’ as a ‘real’ person with a metaphysical existence. The analogy 
would rather be to an entity like a corporation, to which we can assign intentions, goals, and of course, liabilities 
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paratus to understand natural persons’ intentions, preferences, and interests, we need 
not deploy such an apparatus to understand a collective actor like a national public. 
 
What procedure do we use to glean this understanding of the public interest 
from the array of opinions and beliefs in a population? The advocate of this approach 
might point out that while there is no single and determinate procedure for producing 
the public’s ideal point, we can determine with some degree of certainty the general 
policy mood in a nation, namely the public’s general preference for moving either far-
ther to the right or to the left of the policy status quo. A policy mood, for example, 
can be constructed empirically out a composite of public opinion indicators.
40 By mea-
suring the impact of domestic policy moods on the outcomes directly affected by EU 
policymaking and regulatory activity, we could determine how responsive EU policy 
was to underlying ‘national moods.’ If the outcomes over time were systematically 
more responsive to shifts of the domestic policy mood to the right than the left, then 
we would know that there was indeed a neoliberal policy bias; if not, then we might 
conclude that Scharpf was incorrect.
41 Such techniques might well be able to capture 
underlying political values. ‘What the people want’ would no longer be stated as a 
speculative list of general principles but inductively derived as a general preference 
for future policy movements along a single dimension. If indeed it could be shown 
that public attitudes contain only one relevant dimension—that is, that all further prin-
ciples could themselves be placed on the scale and thus ranked and ordered in a 
coherent way—there would be little threat from other substantive conceptions of the 
public interest.
42  
 
In this way, one could avoid the third hypothetical objection by treating a na-
tional public as a plausible unit of analysis based on the ‘no-demos thesis’: the com-
monly recognized fact that the vast majority of Europeans still think of themselves 
first as national citizens, and only second as European citizens. The first and second 
objections—concerns about policy consequences and misrepresentation—would also 
lose some of their bite. The first objection could be parried by pointing to the fact that 
the public opinion model requires very little knowledge of cause and effect. The only 
information citizens would be asked to evaluate would be whether they want the pol-
icy mix promoted by the EU and member states to move farther to the right or to the 
left. No information about specific policies or their effects would be needed. In turn, 
the public opinion model would offer a clear test for the claims of the second objec-
tion, namely whether the particular balance of liberalization and representation of dif-
fuse interests produced by the EU ‘fits’ with the underlying policy mood. If the policy 
mood in different member states clearly indicates a preference for movement toward 
the left, then the second objection would be hard-pressed to show that Scharpf’s left-
                                                 
40 James A. Stimson, Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo: Westview 
Press, 1999). 
41 Building on statistical methods developed to measure ‘dynamic representation’ in the context of American 
politics, we could then use this information to test Scharpf’s argument for the neoliberal bias. See Robert S Erik-
son, et al., The Macro-Polity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
42 Many have argued that this may be a reasonable approximation, at least in many areas of EU regulation. See, for 
example, Simon Hix, Abdul Noury, and Gerard Roland, “A ‘Normal’ Parliament? Party Cohesion and Competi-
tion in the European Parliament, 1979-2001,” (Paper presented at the Public Choice Society conference, San 
Diego, 21-23 March 2002), and Mark A. Pollack, "A Blairite Treaty? Neoliberalism and Regulated Capitalism in 
the Treaty of Amsterdam," in Karlheinz Neunreither and Antje Wiener, eds., European Integration After Amster-
dam: Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp, 266-
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leaning policy reforms would entrench special interests or be otherwise unrepresenta-
tive.  
 
This sort of empirical approach has the significant advantage of bearing, it 
seems, a minimum of normative or philosophical ‘baggage.’ It travels light. It may 
well be satisfactory in the end. Yet its lightness is also its main disadvantage. What 
considerations might push us toward a more philosophical approach to output legiti-
macy?  
 
B. The Role of Normative Analysis 
 
There is reason to doubt whether any empirical analysis of ‘output legitimacy’ 
can in practice overcome the three hypothetical objections to Scharpf’s analysis. To 
ask what individuals would favor if they knew more, what precise conception of 
legitimate majorities obtains, how the trade-off between individual rights and majori-
tarian opinion should be structured, and what scope for deliberation in a multi-level 
polity is to pose a series of questions that are highly resistant to rigorous individual- 
or macro-level empirical inquiry.  
 
Even assuming that the practical difficulties of polling European citizens could 
be overcome, the public opinion model has only moved the issue one step further 
back. When the public opinion model invokes the ‘no-demos’ thesis in responding to 
the objection from scope, for example, we may always ask: Why is the ‘no-demos 
thesis’ a relevant consideration for considering only the results of national public 
opinion polls? Similarly, in responding to the objection regarding biased preference 
aggregation, we may ask: Is short-term public opinion arrayed on a left-right continu-
um a valid indicator of relevant ‘interests’? Once again, simply pointing to the results 
of our public opinion research would be unhelpful. Finally, in responding to the ob-
jection regarding public error, we may ask: How should trade-offs between competing 
goals—or goals that cannot be ordered on a left-right continuum—be assessed? Do 
citizens have meaningful preferences over systems for aggregating preferences and, if 
so, how should they be taken into account? Answering any of these questions by 
claiming that this is what the people ‘want,’ ‘believe,’ or ‘take to be relevant’ would 
beg the question. Not only do we require some independent criterion of how to derive 
a social preference, belief, or concern from a heterogeneous distribution of underlying 
attitudes, but we also require some account of the conditions under which it would be 
reasonable to trump the short-term attitudes of actual majorities in favor of competing 
claims—i.e. to absolute moral imperatives, minority and individual rights, technical 
efficiency, rational coherence and consistency given certain reasonable starting 
points, predicted preference change due to adequate deliberation, and long-term sus-
tainability. Public opinion polls—no matter how sophisticated—cannot help us here. 
 
It is unlikely that any of these concerns can be addressed without normative 
theory. But what kind of normative theory? For example, in constructing an account 
of the ‘public interest’ designed to make evaluations of output legitimacy, could one 
merely argue for an ideal summum bonum toward which all political outcomes should 
be oriented regardless of what citizens in that polity think or believe? Despite its com-
mitment to social democracy, Scharpf’s implicit account of output legitimacy is not 
instrumentalist in this sense, but aims rather to be broadly responsive. But responsive 
in what way? On one hand, as we have seen, our model of the public interest cannot 
merely be derived, in an unproblematic way, from what a public ‘wants’ or ‘believes’   18
without some normative account of the range, scope, and decision rule used to aggre-
gate or otherwise decide among the heterogeneity of interests, preferences, and judg-
ments in a population. On the other hand, we cannot merely abstract from these 
underlying attitudes in favor of ideal conceptions of the justice or the good without 
sacrificing the democratic insistence on responsiveness, necessary for any reasonable 
conception of representative government.
43 Where else to turn? 
 
One method would be to invoke the tools of social choice theory. On this in-
terpretation, we could deploy an independently justified function mapping individual 
utility functions into a general social preference. Variations on this theme might pro-
pose different ways of construing the decision function, as well as different restric-
tions on its input utility functions. Any such analysis would of course have to be sup-
plemented with normative arguments justifying the range, scope, and comparability of 
the utility functions admitted into the calculation, as well as the decision rule used to 
aggregate them. While potentially plausible, such a social choice approach has to sur-
mount Arrow’s Possibility Theorem, which calls into question the stability and coher-
ence of any decision rule (given certain uncontroversial starting points) that one might 
use to generate a single social preference to use as a standard for evaluating policy 
outcomes. It is for this reason, for example, that many leading social choice theorists 
deny any attribution of intentionality to the outcomes of majoritarian decision pro-
cedures, as for example in legislatures.
44 It is hard to believe that we would be much 
better off in applying such decision rules to public opinion writ large, especially in 
view of its much more complex and indeterminate pattern of attitudes. 
 
Instead we may be forced to adopt a “constructivist” attitude toward such cal-
culations—approaching it more like a painting than like a puzzle.
45 For the construc-
tivist, there can be no function directly aggregating individual utility functions into a 
societal ordering: For the same reason as it would be nonsensical to interpret the 
meaning of a painting by applying a mechanical function to the arrangement of lines, 
figures, and shapes, it would be meaningless to do so with a public. Constructive in-
terpretation requires, in the case of art, the imposition of a scheme of aesthetic values 
and principles—composed of conceptions of harmony, beauty, innovation and so 
on—to make sense of the painting. The same is true, according to the constructivist, 
of our evaluative disagreements regarding the public interest: In making sense of the 
vast array of individuals’ interests, preferences, and judgments, we need to ‘impose’ 
some scheme of moral-political values and principles—put together, for example, 
from conceptions of justice, fairness, and right. Only in this way, so goes the argu-
ment, can we derive and defend conceptions of the public interest.  
 
Perhaps unexpectedly, the constructivist approach, we believe, has much more 
in common with the tone of Scharpf’s general argument throughout Governing in 
                                                 
43 See Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). 
44 Kenneth Shepsle, "Congress is a 'They,' Not an 'It': Legislative Intent as Oxymoronm," International Review of 
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45 The idea of constructive interpretation is adapted from Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard 
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Europe, especially where he refers to the ‘postwar social contract,’ than does the so-
cial choice approach.
46 On a constructivist reading, Scharpf’s implicit argument is that 
principles of ‘social inclusion,’ ‘acceptable levels of income,’ and ‘fair sharing of 
taxes and burdens’ represent the public interest not because the people believe they do 
or because this is what the people currently ‘want.’ The principles also represent 
something worth defending, something that has value because they express important 
constitutional commitments taken by citizens to one another. The postwar social con-
tract, the constructivist defense of Scharpf would continue, is worth defending be-
cause it represents the best in postwar European history, born of decades of struggle 
and destitution.
47  In response to the objection from scope, a constructivist reading 
would not argue that nationally bounded welfare states are justified because public 
opinion polls demonstrate that people wish to defend redistribution within national 
boundaries or are unwilling to support redistribution across boundaries. Public opin-
ion polls can provide some information about macro-trends and general beliefs, but 
they cannot tell us which beliefs and which trends are worth defending. What makes 
national citizens responsible to one another is their belonging to a shared history and 
community, which has independent value.
48 A fuller constructivist account would of 
course have to say more; here we have provided merely several examples of what an 
‘interpretation’ of the public interest might entail. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION: BEYOND INPUT AND OUTPUT LEGITIMACY 
 
We are left, therefore, with an irony. The construction of a normatively ap-
pealing argument about the ‘output legitimacy’ of the EU rests, and must rest, on im-
portant and controversial claims about ‘input legitimacy.’ Of course Scharpf could, 
and does, defend his focus on ‘output legitimacy’ in pragmatic terms: Output legiti-
macy is the only feasible basis for bolstering real-world consensus in Europe today. 
But, as we have seen, this empirical claim is questionable at best. The force of 
Scharpf’s argument for most readers lies in their sympathy not with his conception of 
output legitimacy, which is the contingent result of social scientific analysis, but his 
commitment to a particular conception of input legitimacy. Making these underlying 
claims explicit may help to recast the democratic deficit debate in new terms—terms 
that move beyond a purely empirical understanding of the European “democratic 
deficit,” thanks largely to Scharpf’s path-breaking work. 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 E.g. Scharpf, Governing, p. 121. 
47 In this light, there may be other principles accepted by perhaps even wide majorities of Europeans—for ex-
ample, principles regarding zero-immigration policies—which we imagine Scharpf would not conceive to be in the 
public interest. A constructivist argument would show why this restriction is justified, while still remaining 
‘responsive.’ 
48 Along these lines, see the debates on ‘liberal nationalism,’ e.g., Samuel Scheffler, Boundaries and allegiances: 
problems of justice and responsibility in liberal thought (OUP, 2001); David Miller, On Nationality (OUP, 1995); 
and Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton UP, 1993). 